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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
although limiting its application to situations where there is an absence of evidence of
intent of the purchaser. This is indeed a narrowing of that exception since perhaps the
only situation where there will be an absence of evidence of contrary intent will be
where the meretricious spouse is dead and RCW 5.60.030 [RRS § 1211; P.P.C. §
938-3] bars testimony by the surviving "spouse" of what he intended. This limitation
is again stated in the recent case of Poole v. Schrichte, 139 Wash. Dec. 515, 236 P. 2d
1044 (1951), although this case did not involve the problem of resulting trust. In the
Poole case the meretricious husband claimed to be the owner of all the property jointly
acquired by the meretricious parties, since title was in his name. The court gave the
meretricious wife one-half of the property, stating that the result of the Creasman case
was due to a lack of evidence of intent on the part of the grantor. By dictum the court
declared that in each instance where the parties to a meretricious relationship had been
left in the position in which they had placed themselves, one of the parties had been
dead. It does not seem proper to change a presumption of intent simply because of a
lack of evidence, and make the form of the deed the controlling factor only where
there is this lack of evidence coupled with a meretricious cohabitation.
A possible way of reaching the result in the Creannan case, i.e., giving the property
to the grantee, would be to include the meretricious spouse in that class of persons
who are the natural objects of the purchaser's bounty. While it may be more likely
that a man would intend to make a gift to his mistress rather than to make her a
trustee, see 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS 2260 (1939), the weight of authority is contra. Orth v.
Wood, 354 Pa. 122, 47 A. 2d 140 (1946) ; Lufkin v. Jaketnan, 188 Mass. 528, 74 N.E.
933 (1905) ; McDonald v. Carr, 150 Ill. 204, 37 N.E. 225 (1894). There is also
authority, supported by Washington cases, to the effect that the "natural object of
bounty" exception obtains only where there is a "natural, moral, or legal obligation" to
provide for the grantee. Scott v. Currie, supra; Adley v. Pletcher, 55 Wash. 82, 104
Pac. 167 (1909); 1 PERRY, TRUSTS (7th Ed. 1929) § 143. Furthermore, making the
mistress the natural object of the purchaser's bounty might lead to inequitable results
if the mistress were to die intestate. Although the husband takes a share of the sepa-
rate property of his wife, RCW 11.04.020 [RRS § 1341; PPC § 199-1]; RCW
11.04.030 [RRS § 1364; PPC § 200-1], he would have no rights in the property of his
mistress, even though this property may have been his home. As indicated in the
dissenting opinion in Creasnan v. Boyle, it hardly seems natural that a man would
intend to make a gift of his dwelling house to his mistress, so that her heirs would take
the property, to the exclusion of himself.
Retention of the exception of the Creasinan case seems undesirable and unnecessary.
Even if the normal rule of resulting trusts is presumed, and the meretricious wife is
dead, RCW 5.60.030 will not bar her heirs from rebutting the presumption where it
appears a gift was intended, or where the circumstances, i.e., the parties holding them-
selves out as husband and wife, show the purchaser intended the meretricious spouse
should have some, but not all of the property.
ERNEST M. MURRAY
Divorce Decree-Procedure to Invoke Jurisdiction to Modify. H obtained a default
divorce decree under which W was given custody of two minor children and H was
granted reasonable visitation privileges. Later H remarried and established residence
in Montana, and, in order to enable the children to visit him there, filed a motion and
affidavit for an order that W show cause why the decree should not be modified. The
show cause order was granted, but meanwhile W, in an original application in the
Supreme Court, requested a writ of prohibition restraining the Superior Court from
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modifying. She contended that Superior Court jurisdiction to modify cannot be invoked
by a motion and affidavit. Held: Writ granted. RCW 26.08.170 [REm. Supp. 1949 §
997-17] (formerly RRS § 995-3; PPC § 7511-3) provides that "upon filing of a prop-
erly verified petition ... the Superior Court... shall have full and complete jurisdic-
tion of the -cause." State ex rel. Edwards v. Superior Court, 37 Wn. 2d 8, 221 P. 2d
518 (1950). The decision apparently implies that filing a petition is the only effective
procedure.
This is a surprising result. The usual modem view is that there is no substantial
difference between a petition and a written motion. In the language of Gibbs v. Ewing,
94 Fla. 236, 113 So. 730 (1927), "There are no precise boundaries between motions and
petitions. The latter merely amount to motions in writing." In Washington it was
early recognized that the substance and not the form of a pleading determines its
character and effect. In Baer v. LeBeck, 126 Wash. 576, 219 Pac. 22 (1923), the court
said, "It is true that the portion of the application was at the heading termed a motion
but it contains allegations which make it in substance a petition." In re Force, 113
Wash. 151, 193 Pac. 698 (1920) is to the same effect. The court in the Force case
found "no merit" in a contention that a motion was improper procedure when a statute
called for a petition, and later remarked in Harju v. Anderson, 125 Wash. 161, 215
Pac. 327 (1923), that the pleading in the Force case was titled a motion but "in sub-
stance and fact was a petition." More recently the court held that a pleading, though
titled a motion, would be treated as a petition to insure a hearing on the merits. Valley
Iron Works Inc. v. Independent Bakery Inc., 171 Wash. 349, 17 P. 2d 898 (1933). One
court has reached a result exactly contrary to that of the instant case. In Bishop v.
Bishop, 238 Ky. 702, 38 S.W. 2d 657 (1931), it was held that a motion to modify the
custody provisions of a divorce decree satisfies a statute requiring that a petition be
filed.
The instant case is also difficult to reconcile with McClelland v. McClelland, 163
Wash. 59, 299 Pac. 984 (1931), in which the Court observed in another context that the
procedural requirements of REm. REv. STAT. § 995-3, supra, do not apply where the
application for modification is filed in the same county in which the divorce decree was
rendered. The instant case relies on this statute even though all the litigation took
place in the same county.
The decision becomes more confusing when it is noted that a writ of prohibition is
an extraordinary remedy which should not lie unless the trial court is wholly without
jurisdiction. See State ex rel. New York Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Wn. 2d
834, 199 P. 2d 581 (1948).
The instant case, of course, makes little impression on Washington law, but reflects
an unusually strict view of procedure.
RAYmOND H. Simius
Probate-Administration of an Estate Under Absentee Statute. A bank was appointed
guardian of N's estate in 1941, N having been adjudged incompetent. In 1942, N dis-
appeared, and was not heard from for over seven years. P, on behalf of N's heirs,
petitioned the probate court for appointment as administrator of N's estate. The
appointment was made, and the bank appealed. Held: Reversed. Where there is
neither allegation nor evidence sufficient to give the probate court jurisdiction to deter-
mine that the missing man is dead, his heirs are relegated to the absentee statutes for
provisional distribution. In re Nelson's Estate, 37 Wn. 2d 397, 224 P. 2d 347 (1951).
The Washington absentee statute, RCW 11.80.010 et seq. [RRS § 1715-1 et seq.,
PPC § 191-1 et seq.], provides for provisional distribution of an absentee's estate after
